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Wiretap channel capacity: Secrecy criteria, strong
converse, and phase change
Eric Graves and Tan F. Wong
Abstract—This paper employs equal-image-size source parti-
tioning techniques to derive the capacities of the general discrete
memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) under four different
secrecy criteria. These criteria respectively specify requirements
on the expected values and tail probabilities of the differences,
in absolute value and in exponent, between the joint probability
of the secret message and the eavesdropper’s observation and
the corresponding probability if they were independent. Some of
these criteria reduce back to the standard leakage and variation
distance constraints that have been previously considered in the
literature. The capacities under these secrecy criteria are found to
be different when non-vanishing error and secrecy tolerances are
allowed. Based on these new results, we are able to conclude that
the strong converse property generally holds for the DM-WTC
only under the two secrecy criteria based on constraining the tail
probabilities. Under the secrecy criteria based on the expected
values, an interesting phase change phenomenon is observed as
the tolerance values vary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC)
(X , PY,Z|X ,Y × Z) consists of a sender X , a legitimate
receiver Y , and an eavesdropper Z . A messageM is to be sent
reliably from X to Y and discreetly against eavesdropping
by Z . Over n uses of the DM-WTC, let fn : M → Xn
and ϕn : Yn → M be the encoding and decoding functions
respectively employed at X and Y , where M = [1 : 2nR] is
the message set and M is uniformly distributed overM. The
transmission reliability requirement is specified by
Pr {ϕn(Y n) 6= M} ≤ ǫn (1)
where ǫn ∈ (0, 1) denotes the error tolerance. The secrecy
requirement assesses how much one may learn about M from
Zn. This requirement is often quantified by measuring the
level of “independence” between M and Zn based on either
the variation distance
‖PM,Zn − PMPZn‖1
,
1
2
∑
(m,zn)∈M×Zn
|PM,Zn(m, zn)− PM (m)PZn(zn)|
or the divergence D(PM,Zn‖PMPZn) = I(M ;Zn) between
PM,Zn and PMPZn . Another way of quantifying the secrecy
requirement is to view the problem as a binary hypothesis
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testing of the alternate hypothesis of M and Zn being in-
dependent against the null hypothesis of M and Zn being
correlated. This is an interesting case in which we would like
the false positive probability given by the likelihood ratio test
PM,Zn
({
(m, zn) ∈M×Zn : PM (m)PZn(z
n)
PM,Zn(m, zn)
≥ τ
})
→ 1 as n→∞
1where the decision threshold τ ∈ [0, 1) serves as a measure
of secrecy with τ → 1 being the most secret situation. Note
that the log-likelihood log2
PM (m)PZn (z
n)
PM,Zn (m,zn)
may also be used
in the hypothesis testing problem above.
For every (m, zn) ∈M×Zn, define
v(m, zn) ,


[
1− PM (m)PZn (zn)
PM,Zn (m,zn)
]+
if PM,Zn(m, z
n) > 0
0 if PM,Zn(m, z
n) = 0
where [c]+ equals c if c > 0 and 0 otherwise, and
i(m, zn) ,
{
− log2 PM (m)PZn(z
n)
PM,Zn (m,zn)
if PM,Zn(m, z
n) > 0
0 if PM,Zn(m, z
n) = 0.
All the secrecy requirements discussed above can be com-
pactly specified in terms of the tail probabilities and expected
values of v(M,Zn) and i(M,Zn):
S1(δn) : PM,Zn ({v(M,Zn) > δn}) ≤ µn for some µn → 0
S2(δn) : EM,Zn [v(M,Z
n)] = ‖PM,Zn − PMPZn‖1 ≤ δn
S3(ln) : PM,Zn ({i(M,Zn) > ln}) ≤ µn for some µn → 0
S4(ln) : EM,Zn [i(M,Z
n)] = I(M ;Zn) ≤ ln
where δn ∈ (0, 1], ln ∈ (0,∞), and EM,Zn [·] denotes the
expectation w.r.t. PM,Zn . Note that S2(δn) and S4(ln) are
the variation distance and divergence (leakage) constraints, re-
spectively, while S1(δn) and S3(ln) correspond to the secrecy
requirements specified by the hypothesis testing problem using
the likelihood and log-likelihood ratios, respectively.
Clearly these secrecy requirements are related to each other.
For example, we have S1(δn) = S3 (− log2(1 − δn)). Also,
S1(δn) implies S2(δn + µn). By Markov’s inequality, S2(δn)
implies S1(
√
δn) if δn → 0. Thus for vanishing tolerances
(i.e., δn → 0), S1, S2, and S3 are essentially equivalent. In ad-
dition, by Pinsker’s inequality, S4(ln) implies S2
(√
ln ln 2
2
)
if ln ∈ (0, 2ln 2 ).
1Hereafter, convergence of any quantity indexed by n means convergence
as n→∞. For example, δn → 0 means δn converges to 0 as n→∞.
Special cases of these secrecy requirements have been con-
sidered in the literature. For example, requiring ǫn → 0 in (1),
S4(nrl) is the equivocation constraint originally considered
in [1]. Six secrecy requirements S1–S6 are more recently
considered2 in [2]. Setting ǫn → 0, S1 is S4(ln) for some
ln → 0, S2 is S2(δn) for some δn → 0, S3 is S3(ln) for some
ln → 0, S4 is S4(ln) for some lnn → 0, and S6 is S3(ln) for
some ln
n
→ 0.
The majority of known secrecy capacity results under the
above secrecy requirements are for cases with vanishing error
tolerance, ǫn → 0, and secrecy tolerance, ln → 0, lnn → 0,
or δn → 0. These results are nicely summarized in [2], which
shows that the secrecy capacities under S1–S6 (see footnote 2)
of the DM-WTC are all given by maxPU,X I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z),
where U ❝ X ❝ Y, Z . Here we are mainly interested in
cases where both the error tolerance ǫn and secrecy tolerance
δn, ln or
ln
n
are non-vanishing, on which only a few partial
results exist. The oldest such result dates back to Wyner’s orig-
inal paper [1], in which the secrecy capacity under S4(nrl),
where rl > 0 denotes the leakage rate, of the degraded DM-
WTC (PY,Z|X = PZ|Y PY |X ) is calculated for the case of
ǫn → 0. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S4(ln) of the degraded
DM-WTC is obtained in [3] for the case of ln
n
→ 0. This
case has also been extended to the general DM-WTC in [4]
and [5]. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S2(δ) of the degraded
DM-WTC is found in [6].
In this paper, we determine the secrecy capacities for the
general DM-WTC under the above four security requirements,
S1–S4, with non-vanishing tolerances. The converses of all
of these capacity results are new, and are straightforwardly
obtained using our recently developed equal-image-size source
partitioning techniques [4], [7]. Further, the ǫ-secrecy capacity
for each of these four requirements is unique. Under S1 and S3
the strong converse property holds, while it does not under S2
and S4 in general. In addition, under S2 and S4, the capacity
can be broken into distinct phases depending on the error
tolerance. For instance, under S2 the capacity of the channel is
either equal to the capacity of the channel with vanishing error,
or the capacity of the channel with no secrecy requirement.
We call this interesting phenomenon a phase change.
II. MAIN RESULTS
For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we call (fn, ϕn) a (n,Rn, ǫn,Si(ηn))-
code if the domain of fn (i.e., M) is of cardinality 2nRn ,
and the pair satisfy both (1) and Si(ηn). Further we say
the rate error secrecy (RES)-triple (a, b, c) ∈ R3 is Si-
achievable if there exists a sequence of (n,Rn, ǫn,Si(ηn))-
codes such that limn→∞(Rn, ǫn, ηn) = (a, b, c) if i ∈ {1, 2},
and limn→∞
(
Rn, ǫn,
ηn
n
)
= (a, b, c) if i ∈ {3, 4}. Then the
ǫ-secrecy capacity under the appropriate Si(·) is the maximum
R such that the RES-triple (R, ǫ, η) is Si-achievable.
Note that for S3 and S4, the above definition corresponds
to what is called “weak” secrecy in the literature [2]. If
2Note that S5 in [2] seems problematic as it can always be trivially satisfied.
“strong” secrecy is desired, the definition could be modi-
fied to that the RES-triple (R, ǫ, η) is Si-achievable when
there exists a sequence of (n,Rn, ǫn,Si(ηn))-codes such that
limn→∞(Rn, ǫn, ηn) = (R, ǫ, η), for i ∈ {3, 4}. We have
instead chosen to present the “weak” versions of these criteria,
simply because their proofs trivially recover their “strong”
counterparts.
Write C(rl) to denote the capacity of the wiretap channel
subject to the weak leakage constraint rl ≥ n−1I(Zn;M). In
specific,
C(rl) =
max
PW,U,X
min (I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) + rl, I(Y ;U,W )) ,
where |U| ≤ (|X | + 1)(|X | + 3) and |W| ≤ |X | + 3. Two
values of distinction which will arise in our results are that of
C(0) and C(∞) for which
C(0) = max
PU,X
I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
C(∞) = max
PX
I(Y ;X).
Next, restrict ǫ ∈ [0, 1) and δ ∈ [0, 1], and rl ∈ [0,∞). Then
the following theorems give our main results regarding the
secrecy capacities:
Theorem 1. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S1(δ) of the DM-
WTC is given by
C1(δ) ,
{
C(0) if δ < 1
C(∞) otherwise.
for all ǫ.
Theorem 2. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S2(δ) of the DM-
WTC is given by
C2(ǫ, δ) ,
{
C(0) if ǫ+ δ < 1
C(∞) otherwise.
Theorem 3. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S3(nrl) of the DM-
WTC is given by
C3(rl) , C(rl)
for all ǫ.
Theorem 4. The ǫ-secrecy capacity under S4(nrl) of the DM-
WTC is given by
C4(ǫ, rl) , C
(
rl
1− ǫ
)
.
As mentioned before, the main new contributions are the
converses of the theorems. Theorem 2 extends the result
in [6] from the degraded DM-WTC to the general DM-WTC.
Theorems 3 and 4 extend the results in [2] and in [4], [5] to
the case of rl > 0, respectively.
Theorems 1 and 3 state that the ǫ-secrecy capacities of the
DM-WTC under S1(δ) and S3(nrl) are invariant to the value
of ǫ ∈ [0, 1) for all valid values of δ and rl, respectively. In
other words, the strong converse property holds under S1(δ)
and S3(nrl). Although invariant of the error tolerance, the ǫ-
secrecy capacity under S3(nrl) is non-trivially dependent on
the leakage rate rl. In specific, the ǫ-secrecy capacity under
S3(nrl) increases linearly as a function of rl from C(0) until
it saturates at C(∞), the (non-secret) capacity of the discrete
memoryless channel (DMC) (X , PY |X ,Y).
For the secrecy requirements S2(δ) and S4(nrl), Theo-
rems 2 and 4 respectively show that the strong converse
property no longer holds for the DM-WTC as the ǫ-secrecy
capacities generally depend on the value of ǫ. Under S2(δ), the
ǫ-secrecy capacity remains at C(0) as long as ǫ ∈ [0, 1 − δ).
However, for ǫ ∈ [1 − δ, 1), the ǫ-secrecy capacity value
experiences an abrupt phase change, increasing to C(∞) as
if there is no secrecy requirement. Restricting to within either
of the two value ranges, the ǫ-secrecy capacity under S2(δ) is
invariant to ǫ.
Under S4(nrl), the ǫ-secrecy capacity remains at C(0)
when rl = 0 for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1). Note that this also includes the
cases of strong secrecy (S4(ln) with ln → 0) and bounded
leakage (S4(ln) with ln = l). Thus the strong converse
property holds when rl = 0 as proven in [4] and [5]. For any
fixed rl ∈ (0, C(∞)−C(0)), the ǫ-secrecy capacity increases
from C(rl) to C(∞) and then levels off as ǫ increases in
the range [0, 1). The DM-WTC exhibits a phase change from
where the strong converse property holds to where it does not.
When rl ≥ C(∞)−C(0), the ǫ-secrecy capacity value remains
at C(∞) for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1), and the DM-WTC exhibits another
phase change after which the strong converse property holds
again.
III. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
We prove the converses in Theorems 1–4 by employing
the following strong Fano’s inequality developed in [4] and
information stabilization result developed in [7]:
Strong Fano’s inequality. For any (fn, ϕn) of rate R that
gives Pr{ϕn(Y n) 6= M} ≤ ǫ over the DM-WTC, there exist
a random index Qn (correlated with M , Y
n, and Zn) that
ranges over an index set Qn whose cardinality is at most
polynomial in n, ζn → 0, and an index subset
QRn ,
{
qn ∈ Qn : R ≤ 1
n
I(M ;Y n|Qn = qn) + ζn
}
satisfying PQn(QRn ) ≥ 1− ǫ − ζn.
Information stabilization. For the (fn, ϕn) pair, random
index Qn, and index set Qn above, there exist ξn → 0 and an
index subset QZn ⊆ Qn satisfying PQn(QZn ) ≥ 1− ξn:3
1) PZn|Qn(Zˆn(qn)|qn) ≥ 1− ξn, where Zˆn(qn) ,
{
zn ∈
Zn : PZn|Qn(zn|qn) .=ξn 2−H(Z
n|Qn=qn)
}
,
2) there exists a M˜(qn) ⊆ M satisfying
PM|Qn(M˜(qn)|qn) ≥ 1 − ξn, and PM|Qn(m|qn) .=ξn
2−H(M|Qn=qn) for each m ∈ M˜(qn), and
3For any non-negative λn → 0, an > 0, and bn > 0, an
.
=λn bn means∣
∣ 1
n
log2 an −
1
n
log2 bn
∣
∣ ≤ λn.
3) PZn|M,Qn(Z˜n(m, qn)|m, qn) ≥ 1 − ξn where
Z˜n(m, qn) ,
{
zn ∈ Zn : PZn|M,Qn(zn|m, qn) .=ξn
2−H(Z
n|M,Qn=qn)
}
,
for each qn ∈ QZn .
Obtained through the information stabilization result in the
appendix, the following lemma will also be needed:
Lemma 5. For any r ≥ 0, there exist τn → 0, µn → 0, and
λn → 0 satisfying nλn →∞ such that by defining
QSn(r) ,
{
qn ∈ Qn : 1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn) ≤ r + τn
}
and
Ωn(r) ,
{
(m, zn) ∈ M×Zn :
PM,Zn(m, z
n) ≤ 2n(r+λn)PM (m)PZn(zn)
}
,
then
PM,Zn (Ωn(r)) ≤ PQn
(QSn(r)) + µn.
For proving achievability in Theorems 2 and 4, we will
make use of the following lemma to simplify discussions:
Lemma 6. For i ∈ {2, 4}, if the RES-triple (R, 0, η) is Si-
achievable, then the RES-triple (R, γ, (1 − γ)η) is also Si-
achievable for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
A. Proof of Theorem 1
(Direct) For any δ ∈ [0, 1) and ǫ ∈ [0, 1), the RES-triple
(C(0), ǫ, δ) being S1-achievable follows directly from [8,
Theorem 17.11], which in particular shows the RES-triple
(C(0), 0, 0) is S1-achievable. On the other hand, the RES-
triple (C(∞), 0, 1) is S1-achievable since C(∞) is the channel
capacity for the DMC (X , PY |X ,Y), and δ = 1 corresponds
to no secrecy constraint.
(Converse) To prove that C1(δ) is an upper bound on the
ǫ-secrecy capacity under S1(δ), first apply Lemma 5 to obtain
values τn, µn, and λn which converge to 0 as n increases,
such that PM,Zn (Ωn(0)) ≤ PQn
(QSn(0)) + µn, for sets
Ωn(0) and QSn(0) as defined in Lemma 5. We also have that
PM,Zn (Ωn(0)) ≥ 1 − ρn for some ρn → 0, due to S1(δ).
Thus S1(δ) and Lemma 5 together imply that
PQn
(QSn(0)) ≥ PM,Zn (Ωn(0))− µn ≥ 1− ρn − µn. (2)
But then the strong Fano’s inequality and (2) together give the
existence of a qn ∈ Qn such that
R ≤ 1
n
I(M ;Y n|Qn = qn) + ζn (3)
1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn) ≤ τn (4)
since PQn
(QRn ∩ QSn(0)) ≥ 1−ǫ−ζn−ρn−µn > 0 for large
enough n and ǫ ∈ [0, 1). Combining Equations (3) and (4)
gives
R ≤ C(0) + ζn + τn
for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1). On the other hand, when δ = 1, the strong
Fano’s inequality (i.e., (3)) gives
R ≤ C(∞) + ζn
for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1), as in the standard strong converse argument
for the DMC (X , PY |X ,Y).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
(Direct) The RES-triple (C(0), ǫ, δ) is S2-achievable, once
again, by [8, Theorem 17.11], for ǫ + δ < 1. For ǫ + δ ≥ 1,
the RES-triple (C(∞), ǫ, 1−ǫ) is S2-achievable by Lemma 6,
since the RES-triple (C(∞), 0, 1) is S2-achievable.
(Converse) On the other hand, to prove that C2(ǫ, δ) is an
upper bound on the ǫ-secrecy capacity under S2(δ), observe
that S2(δ) implies
δ ≥ ‖PM,Zn − PMPZn‖1
≥
∑
(m,zn)∈M×Zn\Ωn(0)
PM,Zn(m, z
n)− PM (m)PZn(zn)
≥
∑
(m,zn)∈M×Zn\Ωn(0)
PM,Zn(m, z
n)
(
1− 2−nλn)
=
[
1− 2−nλn] [1− PM,Zn (Ωn(0))] . (5)
Thus combining Lemma 5 and (5) gives
PQn
(QSn(0)) ≥ 1− δ − 2−nλn − µn.
As a result, if ǫ + δ < 1, then there must exist a qn ∈ Qn
such that (3) and (4) are simultaneously satisfied since
PQn(QRn ∩ QSn(0)) ≥ 1− ǫ− δ − ζn − 2−nλn − µn > 0
for all sufficiently large n. And therefore,
R ≤ C(0) + ζn + τn
if ǫ + δ < 1. If though ǫ + δ ≥ 1, then the strong Fano’s
inequality (i.e., (3)) gives R ≤ C(∞) + ζn.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
(Direct) The RES-triple ((C(rl), ǫ, rl) is S3 since by defi-
nition ((C(rl), 0, rl) is S3 achievable.
(Converse) On the other hand, to prove that C3(rl) is an
upper bound on the ǫ-secrecy capacity under S3(nrl) of the
DM-WTC, we note that Lemma 5 and S3(nrl) directly imply
PQn
(QSn(rl)) ≥ PM,Zn (Ωn(rl))− µn ≥ 1− ρn − µn (6)
for some ρn → 0. Thus as before the strong Fano’s inequality
and (6) together give the existence of a qn ∈ Qn satisfying (3)
and
1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn) ≤ rk + τn (7)
since PQn
(QRn ∩ QSn(rl)) ≥ 1− ǫ− ζn − ρn − µn > 0. Now
R < C(rl) + ζn + τn
for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1), follows directly as a result of Equations (3)
and (7).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
(Direct) First note the RES-triple
(
C
(
rl
1−ǫ
)
, 0, rl1−ǫ
)
is S4
achievable due to [8, Theorem 17.13]. Hence the RES-triple(
C
(
rl
1−ǫ
)
, ǫ, rl
)
is S4-achievable by Lemma 6.
(Converse) To prove C4(ǫ, rl) upper-bounds the ǫ-secrecy
capacity under S4(nrl) of the DM-WTC, notice that S4(nrl)
implies
rl ≥ 1
n
I(M ;Zn) ≥ 1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn)− α
n
log2 n
≥
∑
qn∈QRn
1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn)PQn(qn)−
α
n
log2 n
≥ min
qn∈QRn
1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn)PQn(QRn )−
α
n
log2 n (8)
where nα is the cardinality bound on Qn. But from the strong
Fano’s inequality, we have PQn(QRn ) ≥ 1 − ǫ − ζn. This
together with (8) implies that there must be a qn ∈ QRn such
that
1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn) ≤
rl +
α
n
log2 n
1− ǫ− ζn . (9)
Again by the strong Fano’s inequality, for this qn we also
have (3). Combining (3) and (8) gives
R ≤ C
(
rl
1− ǫ
)
+
ζnrl + (1 + ζn)
α
n
log2 n
(1− ǫ− ζn)(1 − ǫ) + ζn.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Employing the recently developed techniques of equal-
image-size partitioning, we obtained the ǫ-secrecy capacities
under S1(δ), S2(δ), S3(nrl), and S4(nrl) of the DM-WTC
for non-vanishing ǫ, δ, and rl. The secrecy criteria considered
include the standard leakage and variation distance secrecy
constraints often employed in the literature. Our new results
show that both the capacity value and the strong converse
property of the DM-WTC are in fact dependent on the
secrecy criterion adopted. We conjecture that the interesting
phase change phenomenon observed in cases where the strong
converse property does not hold is commonplace in many other
multi-terminal DMCs.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 5
We need the following lemma to prove Lemma 5:
Lemma 7. Let Qn be a random index ranging overQn, whose
cardinality is at most polynomial in n, and V be any discrete
random variable distributed over V . Then there exist λn → 0
and ξ′n → 0 such that nλn →∞ and
PV,Qn
({
(v, qn) ∈ V ×Qn : PV |Qn(v|qn) .=λn PV (v)
})
≥ 1− ξ′n.
Note that λn and ξ
′
n both depend only on the polynomial
cardinality bound on Qn.
Proof: Let α > 0 be such that |Qn| ≤ nα. First
write A = {(v, qn) ∈ V ×Qn : PV |Qn(v|qn) > n2αPV (v)}
and B = {(v, qn) ∈ V ×Qn : PV |Qn(v|qn) < n−2αPV (v)}.
Then
PV,Qn
({
(v, qn) ∈ V ×Qn : PV |Qn(v|qn) .=λn PV (v)
})
≥ 1− PV,Qn (A∪ B) (10)
where λn =
2α
n
log2 n. Thus the lemma is verified by (10) if
we can show that PV,Qn (A ∪ B)→ 0. In particular, we do so
by bounding PV,Qn(A) ≤ n−α and PV,Qn(B) ≤ n−2α, and
setting ξ′n = n
−α + n−2α.
To bound PV,Qn(A), note that for all (v, qn) ∈ A,
PQn(qn) ≤ n−2α (11)
since
PV (v) ≥ PV |Qn(v|qn)PQn(qn) ≥ n2αPV (v)PQn(qn).
Then the upper bound on PV,Qn(A) follows from (11) as
below:
PV,Qn(A) =
∑
(v,qn)∈A
PV |Qn(v|qn)PQn(qn)
≤
∑
(v,qn)∈A
PV |Qn(v|qn)n−2α ≤ n−α.
The upper bound on PV,Qn(B) follows similarly in that
PV,Qn(B) =
∑
(v,qn)∈B
PV |Qn(v|qn)PQn(qn)
≤
∑
(v,qn)∈B
PV (v)PQn(qn)n
−2α ≤ n−2α.
Apply Lemma 7 three times with V = M , V = Zn, and
V = (M,Zn), respectively. Writing
Γn ,
{
(m, zn, qn) ∈ M×Zn ×Qn :
PM,Zn|Qn(m, z
n|qn) .=λn PM,Zn(m, zn),
PM|Qn(m|qn) .=λn PM (m), and
PZn|Qn(z
n|qn) .=λn PZn(zn)
}
where λn is obtained in Lemma 7, we have
PM,Zn,Qn(Γn) ≥ 1− 3ξ′n. (12)
Next define
Ξn ,
{
(m, zn, qn) ∈M×Zn ×Qn : qn ∈ QZn ,
m ∈ M˜(qn), and zn ∈ Zˆn(qn) ∩ Z˜n(m, qn)
}
with the corresponding QZn , M˜(qn), Zˆn(qn), and Z˜n(m, qn)
as given in the information stabilization result summarized in
Section III. Similar to before,
PM,Zn,Qn(Ξn) ≥ 1− 4ξn. (13)
Combining (12) and (13) gives
PM,Zn,Qn(Ξn ∩ Γn) ≥ 1− 3ξ′n − 4ξn. (14)
From here note that for any (m, zn, qn) ∈ Ξn ∩ Γn,
PM,Zn(m, z
n) ≤ 2n(r+λn)PM (m)PZn(zn)
implies
1
n
log2
PZn,M|Qn(z
n,m|qn)
PZn|Qn(z
n|qn)PM|Qn(m|qn)
≤ r + 4λn, (15)
because (m, zn, qn) ∈ Γn. And then in turn, for all
(m, zn, qn) ∈ Γn ∩ Ξn,
r + 4λn ≥ 1
n
I(M ;Zn|Qn = qn)− 2ξn (16)
since (m, zn, qn) ∈ Ξn. Thus Lemma 5 results from (16) by
setting τn = 4λn+2ξn and µn = 3ξ
′
n+4ξn, because we have
from (14)
PM,Zn(Ωn(r))
≤ PM,Zn,Qn (Ξn ∩ Γn ∩ Ωn(r) ×Qn) + 3ξ′n + 4ξn
≤ PQn
(QSn(r)) + 3ξ′n + 4ξn.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
For i ∈ {2, 4}, we can construct a
(n,Rn, (1− γ)ǫn + γ,Si ((1− γ)ln))-code (fˆn, ϕn), given
that there exists a (n,Rn, ǫn,Si(ln))-code (f
n, ϕn). Whence
the lemma follows by the definition of the RES-triples.
Letting Mˆ be a random variable distributed identical, but
independent, to M . The new encoder, fˆn, is constructed by
setting it equal to f(M) with probability 1− γ and to f(Mˆ)
with probability γ. While the new decoder ϕˆn = ϕn.
Clearly, an error will likely occur if fˆ(M) is set equal to
f(Mˆ). On the other hand, the probability of error will revert
to that of (fn, ϕn) if fˆ(M) is set equal to f(M). Thus the
probability of error for (fˆn, ϕˆn) is at most (1 − γ)ǫn + γ.
Letting PZn,M be the joint distribution of Z
n,M for
induced by fn, we can write the joint distribution of Zn,M for
fˆn as (1− γ)PZn,M + γPZnPM , while the marginals remain
PM and PZn . But then, for the variation distance,
‖(1− γ)PZn,M + γPZnPM − PZnPM‖1
= (1− γ)‖PZn,M − PZnPM‖1.
And for divergence
D ((1 − γ)PZn,M + γPZnPM ||PZnPM )
≤ (1− γ)D (PZn,M ||PZnPM ) + γD (PZnPM ||PZnPM )
= (1− γ)D (PZn,M ||PZnPM ) .
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